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Bracketing: A Phenomenological Theory Applied Through 
Transpersonal Reflexivity 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of bracketing, one of the most 
central philosophical and theoretical constructs of phenomenology, as a theory of mind.  
Furthermore, we wanted to showcase how this theoretical construct can be implemented as 
a methodological tool. 
Design/methodology/approach 
In this study we have adopted an approach similar to a qualitative meta-synthesis, comparing 
the emergent patterns of two empirical projects, seeking synergies and contradictions, and 
looking for additional insights from new emerging patterns. 
Findings 
On a philosophical level, we have found that bracketing, as a theoretical construct, is not 
about the achievement of objectivity, quite to the contrary, it embraces subjectivity and puts 
it centre-stage.  On a theoretical level, we have achieved a better understanding of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, as a theory of mind.  On a methodological level, we have achieved a 
powerful way of supplementing and/or clarifying research findings, by using a theoretical 
construct as a methodological tool. 
Originality/value 
Our paper contributes to the phenomenology literature at a philosophical, theoretical and 
methodological level, by offering a better understanding and a novel implementation of one 
of the central theoretical constructs of phenomenology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we make a new case for an old and often forgotten method: bracketing.  As a 
first approximation, which we will refine throughout the article, bracketing can be 
conceptualised as the researchers’ attempt to hold in abeyance their pre-understandings and 
assumptions to attain experiences before making sense of them.  While bracketing is primarily 
a philosophical and theoretical concept, as phenomenology is a philosophy and a theory of 
the mind, a phenomenological method is incomplete unless it accounts for bracketing.  
Therefore, in this article, we explore the process of bracketing, provide an argument for its 
significance, and offer a reasonably straightforward way of implementing it through what we 
call transpersonal reflexivity.  By doing so, in addition to helping interested readers build a 
phenomenological method for themselves, we also support reflexivity, which is one of the 
distinguishing features of good qualitative research. 
In order to achieve this, we showcase how phenomenology as a theory of mind has informed 
and guided two studies in which we applied the method of bracketing.  Both studies were 
aimed at studying high-complexity phenomena related to extraordinary achievers.  In the first 
one, we were focusing on the cognitive complexity of top scientists (20 in total, 17 of them 
Nobel Laureates).  In the second one, we were focusing on the creativity of top chefs (19 in 
total, 18 Michelin-starred).  In both of these studies we have adopted a variant of 
phenomenological inquiry, utilised in-depth interviews, and developed specific 
phenomenological methods in both cases, in order to cope with the complexity of the 
phenomena we were researching.  In both studies, we implemented bracketing through 
transpersonal reflexivity by engaging in reflexive conversations between researchers, and we 
argue that bracketing served as a source of additional insights supplementing and/or 
clarifying the research findings.  Thus, there is sufficient phenomenological similarity between 
the two studies to bring them together in a reflexive exploration of how we engaged in and 
used bracketing. 
Bracketing is a core concept in phenomenological theory but is also highly controversial.  The 
main reason for this is that phenomenology has provided theoretical grounding for 
interpretivists as well as positivists, and bracketing means very different things depending on 
which philosophical underpinnings are adopted.  In this article, we address bracketing in an 
interpretivist framework, and bring it together with the concepts of reflection and reflexivity, 
which are central to interpretivist research today, and widely regarded as crucial in any 
rigorous qualitative study.  Thus, we address a gap between the somewhat esoteric notion of 
bracketing in the phenomenology literature and the phenomenological research taking place 
in the real world.  While bracketing as a theoretical construct is sound, its implementation as 
a research tool, is often inadequately addressed or skipped entirely.  We believe that one of 
the reasons is that there is shortage of implementation guidelines.  We offer such guidelines, 
but not in the form of an instant tool that can be added without thinking – as we will explain, 
each instance of implementing bracketing through transpersonal reflexivity will be unique 
and (trans)personalised. 
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As we were trying to make the most out of our immensely rich empirical material in both 
above-mentioned projects, we have realised that we engaged in the practice of bracketing.  
Using an approach similar to meta-synthesis, we started to take stock of anecdotal evidence 
in the form of retelling the stories that we have experienced during the two studies.  
Previously we had realised that we could identify numerous similarities between the top 
scientists and the top chefs, this time we were interested in the similarities of the two 
research processes – beyond the fact that they felt very similar, even though technical details 
were different.  One of the dominant similarities was about bracketing – we have engaged in 
bracketing in both studies, in only slightly different ways, although it was not our intention at 
the time to develop a formalised approach to bracketing.  However, we realised that there 
are two robust aspects of bracketing that were common between the two studies and, in 
combination, they seem to be unique in the methodological realm: in both cases we have 
gone through bracketing as a transpersonal process, and in both cases this process involved 
reflection and reflexivity.  Therefore we decided to explore this notion more systematically. 
In order to unpack the concept of bracketing as seen in the two underlying empirical studies, 
we structure this paper as follows.  First we briefly revisit and outline the central concepts of 
phenomenological theory.  Then we provide a short summary of the two empirical studies 
that underlie the subsequent theorising; particularly focusing on their methodological 
processes.  Next we make some preliminary notes on bracketing, as it has been implemented 
in the two empirical studies.  Finally, we revisit the phenomenological concept of bracketing 
in more detail, discuss how we have applied it in the underlying studies and introduce the 
attribute of ‘transpersonal,’ applying it to the notion of reflexivity, in order to understand this 
specific way of implementing bracketing in interpretivist-qualitative studies.  In our 
concluding remarks we emphasise the significance of the improved understanding of 
bracketing and its usefulness as a methodological tool, also exploring its implications. 
PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY 
Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl, at a time when the world of science and 
philosophy was profoundly positivist.  Even Husserl’s teacher, Franz Brentano (1973)[1], 
remained within the positivist paradigm and tried to establish exact laws of the functioning 
of the human mind.  Husserl attempted to establish new foundations of doing research and 
thereby faced strong opposition, because those foundations departed from the positivist 
ideal of scientific inquiry by focusing on the notion of lived experience.  Lived experiences 
cannot be separated from the context of the experience and from the pre-understandings of 
the researchers as well as of the research participants, notions that are unacceptable in the 
traditional positivist approach to scientific research. 
                                                     
[1] Brentano’s book was originally published in 1874 in German: Psychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkte.  The basis of the translation used here is the second edition published in 1924. 
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To date, phenomenological theory is still sometimes used on positivist ontological and 
epistemological basis, although this cannot be considered dominant anymore.  Due to the 
nature of the lived experience, today most phenomenological inquiries are positioned within 
a variant of interpretivism, although the degree of subjectivity adopted by different authors 
varies greatly. 
The most elusive aspect of the lived experience is captured in the central concept of 
phenomenology, as a theory of mind, called qualia, which is a term that refers to the part of 
the lived experience that cannot be put into words.  Qualia[2] are the part of our experience 
that appears in our consciousness, accessible only via introspection, describable only in 
subjective terms (Eliasmith and Mandik, 2006), and even a conscious introspection only leads 
to a ‘feel’: a metaphor and tacitly recognised patterns (Varela and Shear, 1999a, 1999b; 
Sadler-Smith, 2008).  For instance, you cannot fully explain to someone what it feels like 
having butterflies in your tummy when kissing your lover or the joy you felt as a child when 
you smelled your grandmother’s strawberry cake and realised that summer is around the 
corner.  The term qualia, introduced by Lewis (1929), is probably easiest to understand 
through Jackson’s (1982) renowned thought experiment about Mary and the rose.  Here is a 
personal recap of the story.  Mary had grown up in a completely black-and-white 
environment; she was never allowed to leave her room or to see nature.  She had never seen 
any colour apart from black and white.  At the same time, she had been educated about the 
physics of colours, about perceiving them, about the biology of seeing and anything that can 
be explicitly taught about colours.  She had learned everything that can be learned about the 
colours from others, without actually experiencing anything in colour herself.  Then, for the 
first time in her life, she leaves her room.  She sees a red rose and passes out.  Although the 
story remains in some ways unfinished, i.e. we do not find out what finally happened to Mary, 
the message is clear: there is something in the lived experience that cannot be fully explained 
verbally, something that needs to be experienced personally. (See also Chalmers, 2003)  
Phenomenologists usually argue that qualia are the essences of the lived experience, not to 
be confused with the theorised essences we aim to carve out from the phenomena we study.  
In management and business research the role of the lived experience of human beings in the 
work place is likely to be significant to the behaviour of people we study in organizations. 
Then, there are two further fundamental concepts in phenomenological theory; these 
account for the impossibility of divorcing the lived experience from its context of the person’s 
existence.  In phenomenological terms, the latter is called Dasein (usually translated into 
English as ‘existence’ or ‘being there’), which we describe as the idea that being 
human/scientist/chef carries a ‘meaningfulness of self-realization’, while the wider context, 
including the personal history, social aspects, and the pre-understandings of the experiencer, 
is referred to as Lebenswelt (usually translated into English as ‘life-world’).  We adopt the 
original German terms here instead of the translations, as this is customary in the field of 
                                                     
[2] Qualia is plural, the singular would be ‘quale’.  The default use in phenomenology is the 
plural form. 
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phenomenology and the English translations do not convey the full meaning of the original 
notions. 
Historically the notion of Lebenswelt appeared first, as the notable attempt of 
phenomenological theory to combat the positivist notion of isolability of phenomena, which 
has been considered inadequate.  Husserl (1913a, 1913b, 2006) assigned central importance 
to the theme of Lebenswelt, the spatio-temporal context in which the lived experience 
happens.  Intentionality is also a component of the Lebenswelt, which connects 
phenomenological theory with the theory of mind inherited from Brentano.  In turn, Merleau-
Ponty (1945, p vii) argues that phenomenology is a study of essences but also “a philosophy 
which puts essences back into existence”, so into their Lebenswelt.  This argument provides 
an excellent description of the phenomenological quest.  For Gadamer (1989, p 239), 
Lebenswelt is “the antithesis of all objectivism”; it is the whole in which humans live as 
historical creatures and, at the same time, a communal world of being together. 
Introducing the concept of Dasein, Heidegger describes the primary sense of being in the 
Lebenswelt.  Furthermore, Dasein which “itself is out for and going toward something” 
(Heidegger, 1923, p 51) also helps Heidegger getting away from the object-subject dichotomy 
by bringing intentionality into the Dasein (Heidegger, 1975, p 64).  Furthermore, this 
conceptualisation of Dasein emphasises its ephemeral nature, thus connecting it more tightly 
with the notion of qualia: both qualia and Dasein only exist as one-off descriptors of 
experiencing.  In the case of the next experiencing, both the qualia and the Dasein will be 
different.  In contrast, while Lebenswelt also changes over time, this process of change is 
usually slower for the Lebenswelt is more robust. 
One of the potential strengths of a phenomenological inquiry, if conducted properly, stems 
from the three fundamental concepts of phenomenology described so far: qualia embedded 
in the Dasein and in the broader Lebenswelt.  These three concepts with their relationships 
can help researchers to escape the trap of representationalism, as the idea is to work with 
the lived experiences in the contexts in which they occur.  Based on Woolgar (1988), Chia 
(1995, pp. 586-590) explains that more often than not, representationalism leads to an 
epistemological triple-fallacy (cf the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Correctness' in Whitehead, 1926): 
reification, inversion and forgetting.  First, by speculation, we arrive at a representation of 
something that we cannot know whether it exists or not and we project the existence of an 
object that corresponds to this representation.  Reification is the process in which “the 
speculated object begins to take on a life of its own” (Chia, ibid: 589).  Then, we invert the 
roles between the reified object and the representation from which it originates, presenting 
what appears to be a legitimate reason for our research, i.e. that we have found an existing 
object in the first place.  Finally, we forget about how the imagined object came into 
existence, and it is assumed to have become part of reality. 
We do not intend to explore the dynamics between the Dasein and the Lebenswelt in this 
study; these notions are only important to us as a way of framing our understanding of 
bracketing.  The way in which phenomenological theory addresses the problem of 
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representationalism is through the fourth fundamental concept of phenomenology: 
bracketing.  However, before we get into a detailed discussion of bracketing, we introduce 
the underlying empirical studies, particularly their methodological stances. 
THE UNDERLYING EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The basis of the theorising presented here is two underlying empirical projects.  In the first 
one, the first-named author interviewed 20 top scientists, including 17 Nobel Laureates, 
trying to understand cognitive complexity at the highest level of knowledge. (Dörfler and 
Eden, 2017; Feuls, Stierand, Dörfler, Boje, and Haley, 2019)  In the second one, the second-
named author interviewed 19 top chefs, 18 of them having been recognised with Michelin 
stars, in order to understand their creativity. (Stierand and Dörfler, 2012; Stierand, Dörfler, 
and MacBryde, 2014; Stierand, 2015; Stierand and Dörfler, 2016)  Hence, both studies aimed 
at a high-complexity phenomenon in a well-defined context (science and haute cuisine 
respectively) and aimed at understanding the experiences of extraordinary achievers in these 
contexts. (Maslow, 1968, 1970; Gardner, 1993, 1995; Csíkszentmihályi, 1997; Gardner, 1997; 
Nakamura, Shernoff, and Hooker, 2009; Dörfler and Stierand, 2019)  Both studies have been 
grounded in an interpretivist stance, and in both cases we were trying to collect thick data 
and achieve deep and insightful learning; this led us to develop a new method for each of the 
studies.  The method developed for the Extraordinary Scientists project is called Intuitive 
Cyclic Phenomenology (Dörfler and Eden, 2014), emphasising that it explicitly incorporates 
the intuition of the researchers and it has a number of embedded cycles in the process.  The 
method developed for the Extraordinary Chefs project is called Insider Explanatory 
Phenomenology (Stierand and Dörfler, 2014), as it explicitly incorporates the insider view of 
the researcher, who previously worked as a chef in Michelin-starred restaurants and the 
purpose was to develop an interpretive-explanatory model.  Here, we bring these two 
projects together, adopting an approach similar to a qualitative meta-synthesis, comparing 
the emergent patterns of both projects, seeking synergies and contradictions, and looking for 
additional insights from new emerging patterns. (Bondas and Hall, 2007; Park and Gretzel, 
2007; Sandelowski and Barroso, 2007) 
Intuitive Cyclic Phenomenology 
In order to obtain the richest data we used loosely structured open-ended in-depth interviews 
(e.g. as in Fontana and Frey, 1994) from the outset, although the earlier interviews inevitably 
informed the later ones.  However, we deliberately tried to keep the interviews as open as 
possible, simply to have meaningful conversations with the interviewees on any topic with 
respect to their approach to research, to let salient characteristics naturally emerge.  One of 
the authors conducted all the interviews and learned in advance as much as possible about 
both the research and personal histories of the interviewees and so this pre-reading became 
a source of data and pre-understanding. 
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To preserve most of the richness of the interview experience, the co-researcher of the 
Extraordinary Scientists project conducted a series of interviews and concept mapping 
sessions[3] with the interviewer, trying to capture the changes in his intuitive understanding 
of cognitive complexity.  The concepts that emerged from these sessions were then used as 
the basis for a more formal coding of the interviews with the Extraordinary Scientists using a 
variant of content analysis in NVivo[4].  During the coding process additional codes emerged, 
which were discussed in subsequent meetings between the two researchers and added to the 
concept maps.  There were numerous iterative cycles employed resulting in a stable structure 
of findings.  Some of the findings were unexpected and emergent, such as the characteristics 
of successful research as seen by the interviewed Extraordinary Scientists.   
It is perhaps apparent that in the process of ‘interviewing the interviewer’ and concept 
mapping sessions the preunderstandings of the interviewer and particularly his intuition have 
been discussed – i.e. the researchers engaged in bracketing. 
Insider Explanatory Phenomenology 
Insider Explanatory Phenomenology starts with open-ended loosely structured interviews, 
very similar in approach to the above-described interviews.  In addition, it explicitly builds on 
the interviewer’s (here second-named author) professional history, having been a chef in 
Michelin-starred restaurants before embarking on an academic career.  This is emphasised by 
the ‘insider’ notion in the name of the method.  We have been repeatedly criticised for the 
‘lack of objectivity’ of our approach, because of the interviewer’s chef history.  At the same 
time, we have seen this as a major advantage, as a source of insight, as “inherited 
background” (Wittgenstein, 1979, p §94).  Over time, we were able to convince our peers by 
the quality and richness of the data an insider is capable of collecting and analysing and, now, 
with a more elaborate understanding of the notion of bracketing, we can also provide a 
rigorous and dependable method. 
In terms of analysis, this contextualist research approach consists of two phases, the first we 
call idiographic description, the second idiographic explanation.  The first phase builds on 
Giorgi’s (1985b, 1994) descriptive phenomenology as we find it particularly suitable for 
research questions that aim to identify the essential structures underlying the experiences of 
a phenomenon, and thus prefer it over other phenomenological approaches that, for 
instance, aim to capture individual variations between co-researchers (Finlay, 2008b).  In 
addition, we applied a second interpretive-explanatory level of analysis, building on the 
interviewer’s past experience as a chef.  The purpose of the second level was to explain what 
we have learned about the lived experiences of personal creativity from the interviewees’ 
accounts and their self-observations.  In this sense, the second level of analysis is a ‘meta-
level’ of the findings from the first level, that may be seen as a pattern existing beyond the 
descriptive findings, or as particular implications of the descriptive findings, their essence, 
                                                     
[3] Using a causal mapping software strategyfinder (www.strategyfinder.pro). 
[4] NVivo is software designed to facilitate content analysis (www.qsrinternational.com/). 
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their structure, or loosely coupled associations.  The second level of analysis was 
predominantly intuitive, during which, instead of rejecting the subjective experience and 
expertise in the domain, the interviewer had to get immersed in it so completely, that it was 
possible to grasp the essential nature of the phenomenon.  Obtained this way, the concept of 
the personal creativity of chefs was brought to the surface, however, it was embedded in the 
Lebenswelt of chefs and in the Dasein of the particular culinary hot spot.  Therefore the 
interviewer had a discussion with his co-researcher (here the first-named author), who does 
not have an haute cuisine background, but has his Dasein in the Lebenswelt of creativity 
scholars.  In this conversation, as in a translation process (cf. Cassell and Lee, 2017), the 
findings were re-contextualised, thus becoming accessible to a wider audience of creativity 
researchers.  The interaction between the two researchers was a form of bracketing. 
‘Bracketing’ in the Two Studies 
Naturally, in both empirical projects outlined above, the bracketing construct of 
phenomenological theory came up as an important consideration, and we have developed a 
way of implementing it as a methodological tool through transpersonal reflexivity; only we 
did not know at the time that this is how we will call it.  This study aims to unpack this view 
of bracketing, as we believe that doing it well can substantially increase the quality of the 
findings and it has relevance to many other inquiries conducted following similar research 
philosophical, meta-theoretical or theoretical considerations.  Important to mention is that 
we do not see the use of intuition and the insider view as limitations, to the contrary, we 
believe that these were indispensable aspects of the research process and key for achieving 
significant and game-changing findings.  Thus, the notion of bracketing, as we describe it here 
and as we have applied it, is not about getting rid of subjective components and removing 
pre-understandings but raising awareness of them, so that they can be explored, made use 
of, and explicitly incorporated. 
A particularly powerful example of bracketing for the Extraordinary Scientists study was a 
direct source of additional insight.  The interviewer made a remark about the master-
apprentice relationship, to which the co-researcher replied along the lines of:  “You already 
expected that everyone needs to go through a master-apprentice relationship in order to 
achieve the highest level of expertise, you mentioned it before you even started the 
interviews.”  The interviewer replied:  “No, I said that anyone, with the possible exception of 
the genius, has to go through a master-apprentice relationship.”  What was the additional 
insight?  That even the genius5 needs to go through a master-apprentice relationship.  If the 
bracketing did not take place, if the underlying pre-understandings were not explicitly spelled 
out, it would have been simply a note that everyone seems to need to get through a master-
                                                     
[5] We do not intend to elaborate the concept of genius here; Nobel Laureates are not 
necessarily geniuses.  However, one of the interviewees in the Extraordinary Scientists study 
qualifies as a genius (possibly others too, but this was not investigated), and later on the 
interviewer also checked historical examples, such as the one of Mozart described by Gardner 
(1997). 
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apprentice relationship.  The emphasis on ‘even the genius’ increases and solidifies the 
insight’s scope of validity. 
The interviewer in the Extraordinary Chefs study experienced a powerful emotional insight, 
through bracketing, linking to an old memory.  Over a decade before the study, the 
interviewer was a chef apprentice.  His boss, a famous Michelin-starred chef in Germany, once 
told him: “First you have to master the craft and when I wake you up at 3 o’clock at night you 
must be able to tell me without thinking how to make a Sauce Hollandaise and only then you 
can start becoming creative!”  The interviewer intellectually understood this then and there.  
However, during the bracketing process he connected to this memory emotionally, leading to 
a deeper insight.  As the interviewer was telling a dialogue from an interview, his co-author 
asked him about a chef’s focal awareness when cooking, about how, as a chef, he could 
‘forget’ about the knife and be immersed in his creative sensibility.  In an instant, the 
interviewer was back in his chef-apprentice time, not only intellectually but also emotionally 
understanding what the Michelin-starred master said.  This new comprehension bracketed 
out the intellectual pre-understanding and the two authors recognised that extraordinary 
creative chefs are not so much representative of the population of chefs but  much more 
representative of the phenomenon of creativity – this was a seed that grew into a book 
chapter published nearly a decade later. (see Dörfler and Stierand, 2019) 
As we were primarily interested in the personal experiences of our interviewees, we needed 
to deal with the fact that these personal experiences cannot be separated from the context 
of the experience.  Therefore, we considered the interviewees’ Dasein, as well as their 
broader spatio-temporal context, the Lebenswelt, that also accounts for the intellectual 
tradition and domain knowledge of the interviewees’ field of practice.  In a sense, the 
Extraordinary Scientists projects also made use of the insider view, as the interviewer, as a 
researcher, is naturally part of the Lebenswelt of scientists at large.  Yet, having not been 
awarded a Nobel Prize himself, he needed to prepare for each interview meticulously in order 
to establish communication and rapidly win the trust of the interviewees in the first few 
minutes of the interview.  This is only a little glimpse into two extremely enriching and 
fascinating research experiences that both continuously challenged our personal worldviews 
and required from us to revise some of the fundamental theoretical constructs of 
phenomenology, particularly the issue of bracketing. 
BRACKETING REVISITED 
For a long time, scholars understood Husserl’s notion of bracketing as an attempt to 
approximate the positivist ideal of objectivity, because they believed that any form of 
scientific inquiry needs to remove the researcher from the findings.  We believe that this was 
not Husserl’s intention.  He talks about the “naïveté of objectivism” that needs to be 
overcome, as attempted by the German idealists, starting with Kant (Husserl, 1965, p 181).  
Importantly, we have achieved this understanding, only once the second-named author read 
Husserl’s original work in German.  In order to substantiate our belief, we first briefly review 
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Husserl’s approach to bracketing.  We also want to highlight that making our belief explicit 
and unpacking it is also an instance of bracketing, which is in this case applied onto itself, 
perhaps it could be labelled meta-bracketing. 
Husserl (1913a) talked about three forms of bracketing, three related theoretical constructs: 
the epoché or phenomenological attitude; the phenomenological psychological reduction; and 
the transcendental phenomenological reduction. 
Epoché describes the mode in which the researcher refrains from explanations, scientific 
conceptions and knowledge so as to “return to the unreflective apprehension of the lived, 
everyday world”. (Finlay, 2008b, p 3)  This is a critical position where nothing is taken for 
granted (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Zaner, 1975), beliefs, values, or knowledge about the 
phenomenon are “put out of play” (Husserl, 1936, p 237); the researcher refrains from 
judgment (Husserl, 1913a, 1936; Moran, 2000).  In a sense, this first theoretical construct 
comprises the sensations (including feelings, emotions, impressions, etc.), as the first level of 
the lived experience in context.  In other words, it is all about sensing while sensemaking is 
suspended.  (cf Dörfler and Bas, 2020a) 
Phenomenological psychological reduction, in turn, only requires the researchers (Giorgi, 
1997) to suspend their “belief in the existence of what presents itself in the life-world.  Instead 
the focus is on the subjective appearances and meanings” (Finlay, 2008b, p 3).  So, the 
researcher brackets the world but not the empirical subject, to experience the natural 
attitude of the person in all its mundanity (Husserl, 1936; Giorgi, 1997).  In other words, the 
second theoretical construct allows the research participant, but not the researcher, to make 
sense of the sensations. 
Finally, transcendental phenomenological reduction is “a more radical version of the epoché 
where a ‘God’s eye view’ is attempted” (Finlay, 2008b, p 3); Husserl argued that it allows the 
philosopher to be “above his own natural being and above the natural world” (Husserl, 1936, 
p 152).  To put it differently, this third theoretical construct, proposes an opposite direction 
from the previous two, the research participant is abandoned, while the researcher attempts 
to understand the essence of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  This third form of bracketing 
can be better understood using Polányi’s notion of indwelling (Polányi, 1962b, 1962a; see also 
Dörfler and Stierand, 2018), according to which the greatest scientific breakthroughs are 
achieved by the scientists’ complete indwelling in the phenomenon, summoning all their 
knowledge of the subject and their understanding of science in general.  Polányi (1969) uses 
Einstein’s example of perceiving the theory of relativity, arguing that through complete 
indwelling Einstein intuitively (cf Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012) made the assumption that a 
light source would never overtake a beam sent out by it, although he was not familiar with 
the outcome of the Michaelson-Morley experiment. 
Some later interpretations of the theoretical triple-construct of bracketing shifted towards 
what we wanted to achieve.  For instance Gadamer (1989, p 237), advancing his interpretivist 
agenda, finds the essence of phenomenology in “bracketing all positing of being and 
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investigating the subjective modes of given”.  Giorgi (1994, p 212) considers it as a process 
whereby “one looks at the data with the attitude of relative openness”.  Finlay (2009, p 13) 
talks about a “dialectic movement between bracketing preunderstandings and exploiting 
them reflexively as a source of insight”.  Similarly, the approach in these cases is aligned with 
our intentions to understand the interviewees’ perspective including the identification of 
elements that blur the invariant but essential nature of the interviewees’ experiences 
(Husserl, 1931; Giorgi, 1994).  This is also the reason for the numerous iterative cycles in both 
empirical studies, treading a fine line between “knowing and not-knowing” (Gioia, Corley, and 
Hamilton, 2013, p 21).  The summary of the role of bracketing in some phenomenological 
framings can be seen in Table 1.  All these conceptualisations, however, say little about the 
implementation. 
It was when we started thinking about how we would implement bracketing as a 
methodological tool that we started to understand it better as a theoretical construct.  As 
argued by Eden and Ackermann (2018) in relation to one purpose of action research being 
the way in which theory is developed through attempting its application.  The reason is that 
implementation raises simple problems, such as:  ‘How can I now forget what I have 
previously known about cooking?’  ‘I cannot stop believing that the master-apprentice 
relationship is important!’  Bracketing does not mean stopping things from happening.  We 
do not stop believing in something, instead, we make our belief explicit, so that we can 
consider how it may affect our understanding (cf Eden and Ackermann, 2018).  This also 
means that all the terms that we use to help explain bracketing, such as suspending, 
refraining, holding back, etc. are not really good descriptors, as they suggest that we can stop 
from happening what we bracket out.  However, bracketing is more about making conscious 
what is happening anyway, whether we like it or not.  Furthermore, we can stop acting upon 
something we want to bracket, and that can help.  For instance, we cannot remove our beliefs 
and values, but we can refrain from judgement, explicitly acknowledge our beliefs and values 
that would prompt judgement, and use them as sources of insights.  With such improved 
comprehension, we finally ventured into intentionally implementing bracketing.  Finally, we 
have implemented the theoretical construct of bracketing in two stages in both studies (the 
first through personal, the second through transpersonal reflexivity), although the order of 
these stages was different, and it was practiced at different phases of the research process 
(Figure 1). 
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Table 1: Bracketing in relation to some phenomenological frameworks 
Phenomenology 
Main authors 
Research objective Bracketing 
Descriptive Phenomenology 
Giorgi (1975, 1985a, 1997, 
2006) 
Describe the essential 
structure of the lived 
experience. 
Look at the data with the 
attitude of relative openness. 
Heuristic Inquiry 
Douglass and Moustakas 
(1985) and Moustakas (1990, 
1994) 
Produce a description through 
creative synthesis to explicate 
lived experience challenging 
extreme levels of perception.. 
Balance passion and discipline, 
take subjectivity to extreme 
and discuss with others 
experiences to root out 
meanings completely. 
Relational Phenomenology 
Finlay (2008a, 2009) and Finlay 
and Evans (2009) 
Capture individual variations 
between co-researchers to 
understand the experiencing 
person. 
Open yourselves to being 
moved by an Other; manage 
evolving understandings in a 
relational context. 
Phenomenology of Perception 
Merleau-Ponty (1945) 
Perceive the totality (Gestalt) 
of the embodied experience. 
Acknowledge the parallel 
existence of a priori and de 
facto, try pushing back the 
opacity, accepting that it is 
impossible to eliminate it. 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Gadamer (1975, 1989) 
Understand the knower and 
the known, as inseparable, in 
context, each with its own 
historicity. 
Look beyond the world and 
scientific knowledge to access 
the pure subjectivity while 
accepting that the ‘I’ is also in 
the Lebenswelt. 
Reflective Lifeworld Approach 
Dahlberg, Dahlberg, and 
Nystrom (2008) 
Elucidate the Lebenswelt in 
which the person’s sense of 
self-identity and embodied 
relations affect the 
experiencing. 
Have patience for phenomena 
to reveal their complexities 
rather than impose models. 
Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) 
Smith and Osborn (2008) 
Make general claims on the 
basis of examining 
idiosyncratic lived experiences 
of participants. 
Capture individual variations 
between co-researchers in 
making sense of the research 
participants. 
Critical Narrative Analysis 
(CNA) 
Langdridge (2007) 
Co-create stories of 
experiencing with the 
participants in the research 
context. 
Disclose the learning process 
through which the researcher 
achieved a confidence in 
understanding the 
phenomenon from the 
participants’ perspective. 
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Figure 1: Instances of bracketing 
The first stage of bracketing (personal reflexivity, red braces on Figure 1), primarily 
corresponding to epoché and to a lesser extent to the phenomenological psychological 
reduction, was practised by the interviewer; this stage was primarily focused on suspending 
judgement in order to arrive at an intuitive understanding of the interviewees’ subjective 
accounts of their lived experiences.  This stage of bracketing took place in two phases of the 
research process, the data collection and the analysis.  The first, and with hindsight 
remarkably important, instance of bracketing happens during the interview.  By bracketing 
out the pre-understandings, beliefs, and values the interviewer keeps an open mind and 
listens to the participant better.  The second instance of bracketing is still within the data 
collection phase; it happens when the interviewer prepares the field notes.  This immediate 
recollection of the interviewing experience, with all aspects of the Dasein and Lebenswelt, 
also gives a chance to raise awareness of bracketing missed during the interview process.  
Later, when the interviewer engages in the analysis, the bracketing is practiced again (third 
instance), trying to make sense of the rich data collected.  This happened at different phases 
of the analysis in the two projects.  In the Extraordinary Chefs study, the interviewer did the 
first step of the analysis on his own, and in this descriptive phase, it was very important to be 
faithful to the participants’ accounts.  In the Extraordinary Scientists study the first phase of 
the analysis happened between the two researchers, and the interviewer was working with 
the data by himself only later, when he was coding the interview and other material.  
However, the order of phases is the only difference; the attitude to bracketing was the same 
in both cases.  The three instances of bracketing described so far are pursued by the 
interviewer alone, and they all involve personal reflexivity (cf Finlay, 2008a) rather than 
transpersonal reflexivity. 
However, more interesting was how we implemented the second stage of bracketing, which 
is implemented through transpersonal reflexivity (green braces on Figure 1).  This happened, 
in the case of both empirical projects, in the interaction between the interviewer and the co-
researcher; this mainly corresponds to the phenomenological psychological reduction but 
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also features elements of the transcendental phenomenological reduction.  In the 
Extraordinary Scientists study, the first phase of analysis was in the interaction of the two 
researchers.  The interviewer was interviewed by the co-researcher, trying to shed light on 
the interviewer’s intuitions and, although recognised only with hindsight, also to bracket the 
interviewer’s pre-understandings, beliefs, and values.  In the Extraordinary Chefs study, the 
two researchers only came together in the second phase of the analysis, once the interviewer 
already obtained the descriptive findings.  In the second phase of the analysis the researchers 
created the idiographic explanations based on the descriptive findings, and they have 
practiced the second stage of bracketing. 
The purpose of the second stage of bracketing was to raise the awareness of presumptions, 
previous knowledge and beliefs, of which the interviewer was not aware.  This has been 
achieved by practising transpersonal reflexivity.  Reflexivity here is conceptualised as a deeper 
process than simple reflectivity, and beyond subject-reflection it also includes self-reflection. 
(see e.g. Brannick and Coghlan, 2007; Hibbert, Sillince, Diefenbach, and Cunliffe, 2014; 
Hibbert and Cunliffe, 2015)  Furthermore, the attached ‘transpersonal’ attribute is rooted in 
Polányi’s (1962a, 1966) notion of ‘personal knowledge’.  Transpersonal goes beyond the 
notion of interpersonal, as the persons involved in the process engage in ‘thinking together’ 
(Pyrko, Dörfler, and Eden, 2017) in which the personal boundaries are transcended resulting 
in a single thinking process in which two or more persons are involved.  Such deep 
engagement is necessary, as the two researchers need to attain the same essences. 
In the research process this meant that the co-researcher, who was not involved in the 
interviews and deliberately did not read them, held a mirror to the interviewer in support of 
the reflexive process.  Going through the cycles present in both methods also meant going 
back and forth between the two stages of bracketing, respectively employing personal and 
transpersonal reflexivity, thus achieving the above mentioned ‘attitude of relative openness’.  
The process is time-consuming and requires deep engagement between the researchers, but 
it is also exceptionally fruitful – at least, in our experience from the two studies on which this 
paper was based. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We believe that the two main reasons for few phenomenological studies in management and 
organisation scholarship are (1) a lack of understanding of bracketing as a construct and (2) 
its highly philosophical nature.  We have addressed both of these issues in this article.  More 
precisely, we explored the notion of bracketing at a philosophical, theoretical, and 
methodological level, digging into the first conceptualisation of phenomenology by Husserl.  
Going back and forth between the philosophical, theoretical and methodological levels, in the 
context of the two studies, we believe that we added substantial clarity to the essence of this 
construct.  We have shown that in an interpretivist framework bracketing can be 
conceptualised as raising awareness and making explicit our pre-understandings, values, 
beliefs, rather than getting rid of them, which would be impossible anyway.  Furthermore, if 
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conceptualised this way, bracketing can be a source of insight into the essential nature of 
experiences.  The highly philosophical nature of bracketing has been acknowledged within 
the management and organisation scholarship, but little has been said about how to 
implement and practice it as a methodological tool.  We have illustrated the implementation 
of bracketing using two underlying empirical studies, producing hands-on guidelines for 
researchers who want to use bracketing in their research.  By linking the notion of bracketing 
with reflection and reflexivity, we also highlight the role of bracketing in rigorous qualitative 
research in the management and organisation field.  In some fields, such as psychology 
(Finlay, 2008a; Finlay and Evans, 2009; Fischer, 2009) and health research (Ahern, 1999; 
LeVasseur, 2003; Gearing, 2004), bracketing has been linked with reflection and reflexivity.  
However, this was always personal reflection and reflexivity, the transpersonal reflexivity is 
an original contribution of this article.  The significance of our study therefore is an increased 
understanding of bracketing at a conceptual as well as applied level, which will hopefully 
enable a larger number of phenomenological studies in the field. 
The obvious limitation of our theorising presented in this article is that it is only based on two 
empirical studies.  However, we see this limitation as an opportunity for other management 
and organisation scholars to develop many further implementations.  Although we believe 
that other studies may need somewhat different implementations, we believe that the logic 
of our approach, the underlying principles are robust, and further idiosyncratic 
implementations will confirm this. 
On reflection, when we engaged in bracketing for the first time(s), in the empirical studies 
outlined in this article, we did so being unaware of what we were doing.  Once we recognized 
our transpersonal reflexive processes as bracketing, we started to be more mindful about it.  
Whenever we were interested in the lived experience, we did engage in some form of 
bracketing, which was always achieved through transpersonal reflexivity.  This was true when 
we have worked together or with other co-authors, and even when it was just one of us, we 
invited someone to ‘bracket with’ (Dörfler, 2010; Stierand and Zizka, 2015; Baracskai and 
Dörfler, 2017; Bas, Dörfler, and Sinclair, 2019; Miralles, Stierand, and Dörfler, 2019; Pyrko, 
Dörfler, and Eden, 2019; Stierand et al., 2019; Dörfler and Bas, 2020b; Harrington and Dörfler, 
2020; Harrington, Dörfler, and Stierand, 2020; Miralles, Stierand, Lee, and Dörfler, 2020; 
Rayan, Dörfler, and Lennon, 2020; Shpakova, Dörfler, and MacBryde, 2020; Spanellis, Dörfler, 
and MacBryde, 2020; Stierand, Heelein, and Mainemelis, 2020).  Why is it always 
transpersonal reflexivity?  Perhaps because it is so natural to happen between co-researchers: 
we talk, discuss what we see, challenge each other – all in an attempt to produce the best 
quality research we can.  Importantly, even when we do not report in a publication about 
bracketing, we still use it, as a way of improving our research as well as increasing our 
confidence in our findings.  The actual process of transpersonal reflexivity through which we 
exercised bracketing was a little different every time, but in each case it could fit within the 
guidelines outlined in this article.  We also see a possibility for extending the concept of 
bracketing beyond its natural habitat, phenomenology.  How being judgemental or using our 
preunderstandings can pollute our research, is particularly easy in the context of 
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phenomenology, as the focus is on the lived experience.  However, the same things can 
pollute any kind of research, regardless of the focus or philosophy stance.  Perhaps, it is worth 
thinking about a more ubiquitous conceptualisation of bracketing, that can apply in any sort 
of qualitative (and we also believe quantitative) research – we plan to engage in such thinking, 
but it is beyond the scope of this article. 
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